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The Appellee Truck Insurance Exchange respectfully 
petitions the Court for a rehearing in the above-captioned matter. 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER 
Harold C. Verhaaren, counsel for the Appellee/Petitioner, 
Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"), certifies that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this Petition for 
Rehearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL 
The Defendant/Appellants John Olcott and Betty Olcott, 
dba JB's Pepper Tree Market ("OlcottsM) appealed from the Summary 
Judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court granting TIE•s motion for 
summary judgment dated December 13, 1991. Oral argument of the 
appeal was heard on September 27, 1994, by The Honorable Pamela T. 
Greenwood, The Honorable Gregory K. Orme, and The Honorable 
Russell W. Bench. The Court, on its own motion, issued its 
expedited decision pursuant to Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In an order dated September 27, 1994, this 
Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the 
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trial court for further proceedings. No written explanation for 
the Court's Order of Reversal1 was given 
POINTS OF FACT AND LAW OVERLOOKED OR 
MISAPPREHENDED BY THE COURT 
TIE respectfully submits that the points of fact and law 
specified below were apparently overlooked or misapprehended by the 
Court. Because there is no written explanation or statement of the 
grounds for the Court's decision, TIE'S undersigned counsel 
acknowledges that he has necessarily speculated regarding the 
reasons for the Court's decision, but believes the filing of this 
Petition for Rehearing is appropriate, as the issues which were 
properly before the Court for its review are relatively 
uncomplicated. 
I. OLCOTTS DID NOT OPPOSE THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY TIE IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It appears the Court has overlooked the fact that the 
affidavit of its representative and employee, Brad Chilton (the 
"Chilton Affidavit")2 filed in support of TIE'S Motion for Summary 
Judgment is unopposed. The Olcotts filed no opposing affidavit, 
nor have they otherwise disputed any of the facts contained in 
Chilton's Affidavit. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides, in part: 
1
 A copy of the Order of Reversal is included in the Addendum 
to this Petition ("Addendum") as Attachment A. 
2
 A copy of Chilton's Affidavit is included in the Addendum as 
Attachment B. 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts, showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment shall 
be entered against him. 
Further, in their Memorandum (R. at 417) opposing TIE'S 
motion for summary judgment, Olcotts did not controvert any of the 
statements contained in the "Undisputed Facts" portion of TIE'S 
memorandum. Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration provides: 
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing part relies, and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movant' s facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by 
an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the opposing party's statement. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The facts, therefore, as stated in the Chilton Affidavit 
and in TIE's statement of undisputed facts are deemed admitted by 
the Olcotts. Moreover, the denials in their Answer to TIE'S 
Complaint are not sufficient to counter the Chilton Affidavit. 
Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983); D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). Olcotts 
simply failed in their affirmative duty to respond with affidavits 
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or other materials allowed by subdivision (e) of Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The inescapable conclusion is that 
there are no material facts in dispute. 
II. OLCOTTS* ASSERTED NO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THEIR ANSWER 
TO TIE'S COMPLAINT. 
Olcotts' Answer3 to TIE's Complaint contains no 
affirmative defenses. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that affirmative defenses must be set forth in 
the Answer. If they are not so asserted, they are waived, and may 
not be put in issue by a denial. Pratt v. Board of Education, 
564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken. 
668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). 
Notwithstanding their failure to plead any affirmative 
defenses, Olcotts have argued on appeal, and apparently this Court 
may have accepted their argument, that TIE is barred by the 
principles of estoppel and laches from claiming any earned premium 
due other than the "estimate" on their application to Prematic 
Service Corporation for financing. They also argued that TIE is 
estopped from claiming any premium due because the first notice of 
cancellation dated January 22, 1985, did not indicate an earned 
premium was due. The latter estoppel argument, even had Olcotts 
not waived this defense, is without merit in light of the fact that 
a payment notice to the Olcotts dated on or about March 16, 1985 
3
 A copy of Olcotts • Answer in included in the Addendum as 
Attachment C. 
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(R. at 257) and a notice of cancellation to them dated April 14, 
1985 (R. at 258) do show an earned premium due and demand payment. 
In any event, these and Olcotts1 arguments based upon estoppel, 
laches and other avoidance defenses should be rejected by this 
Court, just as they were by the trial court. 
III. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A FINAL JUDGMENT AND ADJUDICATED 
ALL CLAIMS REMAINING IN THIS ACTION. 
Olcotts asserted, for the first time during the rebuttal 
portion of their oral argument on appeal, that there are claims 
remaining in this action which were not adjudicated by the trial 
court's grant of TIE'S motion for summary judgment. If such were 
the case, why did they not move for certification of the summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as they would be required to do if there were 
unadjudicated claims remaining, or why did they not seek an appeal 
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
Olcotts chose the course they have followed on appeal and should be 
bound by their election. Based upon the record, there can be no 
conclusion other than that the trial court and the Olcotts deemed 
the summary judgment to be a final appealable order. Olcotts' 
belated argument to the contrary is without merit and should have 
been rejected. 
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IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CONSIDERED ISSUES RAISED BY 
OLCOTTS FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
For the first time on appeal, Olcotts raised issues 
relating to (1) the affirmative defenses referred to in Point II 
above; (2) the issue that all claims were not adjudicated by the 
trial court referred to in Point III above; (3) the issue that 
TIE'S Complaint, to the extent that it seeks to recover earned 
premiums computed at the preferred ratef is barred by the statute 
of limitations; and (4) the claim that TIE'S Complaint does not 
seek recovery based on the Olcott's first application, but is based 
on the second application.4 Because these issues were not raised 
in the proceedings before the trial court, this Court should not 
have considered them. Ong Int' 1 (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp. , 
850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of 
Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). Moreover, Olcotts made no 
claim, and there has been no showing, that the trial court 
committed plain error. 
4
 Significantly, Olcotts' assertion in this regard is a 
complete reversal of their argument opposing TIE'S first motion for 
summary judgment, when they asserted that the Complaint is based on 
the first application. Their argument on appeal, that the 
Complaint is based on the second application, was not raised at the 
trial court (R. at 417-425). 
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V. ONLY THOSE ISSUES SPECIFICALLY RELATING TO TIE'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT FOR REVIEW. 
In their belated attempt to show a genuine factual 
dispute, Olcotts, throughout their brief and during oral argument, 
improperly asserted arguments which relate only to TIE•s first 
motion for summary judgment. All material factual disputes 
relating to that motion, however, were conceded by TIE for purposes 
of its second motion for summary judgment, and are not before this 
Court for review. TIE accepted the Olcotts contention that: (1) 
they never submitted or authorized the submission of a second 
application for insurance coverage; (2) they did not desire 
insurance coverage at TIE'S standard rate; (3) the signature on the 
second application is not the signature of Betty Olcott; (4) the 
Olcotts• liability for insurance coverage must be limited to the 
earned premium calculated at the preferred or lower rate and (5) 
the period of insurance coverage extended from March 30, 1984, only 
to February 6, 1985, rather than to April 30, 1985. Thus, all 
factual disputes relating to the second application have been 
eliminated. Moreover, the rate and premium calculations set forth 
in the Chilton Affidavit have never been challenged by the Olcotts 
and during oral argument on appeal, their counsel acknowledged the 
accuracy of such calculations. 
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VI. OLCOTTS* INSURANCE COVERAGE WAS PROVIDED PURSUANT TO 
POLICY NO 6572-64-73 AND THAT POLICY IS THE SUBJECT OF 
TIE'S COMPLAINT. 
TIE seeks to recover the earned premium owed by Olcotts 
for insurance coverage provided them pursuant to policy no. 
6572-64-73. This is the policy which is the subject of TIE'S 
Complaint. There is no other policy. It appears that Olcotts 
successfully diverted the Court's attention from this fact with 
their contention that the Complaint is based upon the second, 
rather than the first, application. As noted in Point IV above, 
Olcotts' argument is a complete (and convenient) about-face from 
their argument opposing TIE'S first motion for summary judgment, 
when they contended that the Complaint is based upon the first, 
rather than the second, application. This switching of positions 
to suit their convenience does not, however, create any dispute as 
to a genuine issue of fact, nor does it make any difference as a 
matter of law. The undisputed facts remain that Olcotts received 
the insurance coverage they requested, the coverage was provided 
pursuant to the policy designated in TIE'S Complaint, and they 
failed to pay for that coverage, regardless of whether the premium 
is calculated at the standard or preferred rate. Because the 
damages sought in TIE'S Complaint is different from those proved 
and awarded does not alter the foregoing facts or render the 
Complaint defective. The law does not require the exact dollar 
amount of damages to be specifically pleaded, even when the damages 
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sought are special damages• Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 
811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991) and cases therein cited. 
VII. PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH LAW, TIE IS REQUIRED 
TO PROVIDE INSURANCE COVERAGE AT THE RATES APPROVED BY 
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER. 
The Insurance Code5 of the State of Utah specifies that 
one of its purposes is "to protect policy holders and the public 
against the adverse effects of excessive, inadequate, or unfairly 
discriminatory rates"6 and provides that: 
No insurer shall make or permit any unfair 
discrimination in favor of particular individuals 
or persons, between insurants or subjects of 
insurants having substantially like insuring risks 
and exposure factors . . . or in the rate or 
amount of premiums charged therefor . . . .7 
To assure that the foregoing purposes are realized, the Insurance 
Code requires that insurers use only those rate filed with and 
approved by the insurance commissioner. 
The earned premium which TIE seeks to recover has been 
computed at and conforms to the rates approved by the insurance 
commissioner for the period in question.9 Those rates reflect not 
only the rates approved by the insurance commissioner, but the 
reasonable cost of the insurance coverage provided by TIE. 
5
 References are to Utah's Insurance Code effective in 1984-
85, i.e., Utah Code Annotated §§ 31-18-1 et seq. 
6
 § 38-18-1(2) 
7
 § 31-27-22(1) 
9
 Chilton Affidavit, paragraph 14. 
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If this Court's decision is intended to support the 
principle urged by Olcotts, that an insurance agent's quote of an 
estimated premium relieves the insurer from adhering to the rates 
approved by the insurance commissioner/ then the Court, in effect, 
has allowed the repeal of the statutes in question through the non-
legislative device of an agents' estimate. Does an agent in Utah 
have authority to fix rates different than those approved pursuant 
to state statute? TIE urges that such a conclusion is not only 
contrary to the provisions of the Insurance Code, but is a 
significant departure from the general principle that, ordinarily, 
no occasion arises when an agent, in the absence of express 
authority, has the authority to fix the rate of premiums. See, 43 
Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 830. 
VIII. THE PREMATIC APPLICATION IS AN APPLICATION FOR 
FINANCING - NOT AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE. 
Olcotts do not dispute that their application for 
insurance coverage did not specify rates or premiums when submitted 
by them10, but they point to the financing application as the sole 
basis for their claim that no earned premium is owed. Olcotts* 
10
 See Chilton Affidavit, Attachment 2, paragraphs 8 through 
10, which state that TIE'S applications for commercial insurance 
coverage, such as the Olcotts' application, do not specify rates 
when submitted by the writing agents, that the setting of premiums 
for each risk is the function and responsibility of the rating 
department, that the rates and computations on the application were 
added to the application after it was received by TIE at its 
regional office and that TIE'S rates charged in the State of Utah 
must conform to the rates filed by it with the Insurance 
Commissioner. 
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claim that TIE is bound by the agent's estimate on the application 
for financing and that the estimate should be a guaranteed maximum 
premium is not sustainable for the following reasons, in addition 
to those set forth in Point VII above: (1) the Prematic agreement 
is a financing agreement; (2) TIE is not a party to the Prematic-
Olcott financing agreement; (3) Prematic Service Corporation is not 
an insurer; and (4) the premium is clearly identified as an 
"estimate." 
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) defines estimate as 
"a rough or approximate calculation only." Clearly, an "estimate" 
is not a synonym for "maximum." Even if the Prematic application 
were deemed to contain a binding premium quote, it specifically 
provides that Olcotts "[a]uthorize Prematic Service Corporation to 
properly adjust the monthly premium deposit collected each month in 
event of changes of coverage or rates ordered either by customer or 
insurance company." (emphasis added.) It is significant and 
undisputed that Olcott's application was incomplete, as submitted 
by them, with respect to crime coverage (see, page 2 of 
application) and previous incidents of theft (see, page 4 of 
application) . TIE should not be bound by the quote of an estimated 
premium, clearly designated as such, which is based upon an 
incomplete application incomplete on its face. 
- 11 -
CONCLUSION 
TIE respectfully suggests that the foregoing points of 
fact and law, provide a sufficient basis for the Court to grant 
this Petition for Rehearing and to affirm the trial court's summary 
judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ / day of October, 1994. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, PC 
. Attorneys for Petitioner 
/Original Signature Harold c. verhaaren 
David B. Hartvigsen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the o// day of October, 1994, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING OF 
APPELLEE TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, by causing the same to be 
mailed, via first-class United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Thomas J. Scribner 
Wayne B. Watson 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
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Tab A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Truck Insurance Exchange, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John Olcott and Betty Olcott, 
dba JB's Pepper Tree Market, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 7 1994 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER OF REVERSAL 
Case No, 930232-CA 
Before Judges Onae, Bench, and Greenwood (Rule 31 Hearing). 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is reversed, and 
this matter is remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Dated this ^fch^ilay of September, 1994. 
Gregory K^ -Q^ erne, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
; -j c <^ --~-? 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I IS @ 11DWH 
»29l994 
M — — J 
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4™ DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COU.MTY 
DEC 13 llosffl 'Sr 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325 iW^ 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-6161 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY OLCOTT, 
dba J.B.'S PEPPER TREE MARKET, 
BRAD G. CHILTON AFFIDAVIT II 
Case No. CV 89-760 
Judge George E. Ballif Defendants. 
000O000 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK ) 
Brad G. Chilton being first duly sworn deposes and says: 
1. All matters stated herein are based upon his 
personal knowledge and he is competent to testify to the matters 
stated herein. 
2. He is an employee of the Plaintiff, Truck Insurance 
Exchange (MTIEM), is personally acquainted with TIE'S files and 
records relating to the Defendants John Olcott and Betty Olcott, 
dba J.B.'s Pepper Tree Market (the "Olcotts") and the claim TIE is 
asserting against the Olcotts in the above-captioned matter. 
* *i 
3. On or about December 5, 1984, TIE received at its 
Pocatello Regional Office Olcotts' application for insurance 
coverage dated November 30, 1984, (the "Application") executed by 
the Defendant John Olcott. A copy of the Application is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit A." 
4. On or about November 30, 1984, the Defendant John 
Olcott also executed an application and agreement with Prematic 
Service Corporation ("Prematic") to finance the estimated annual 
premium for the insurance coverage Olcotts applied for through 
monthly budget payments. A copy of the Prematic application and 
agreement is attached hereto as "Exhibit B." 
5. Prematic received two checks issued by the Defendant 
John Olcott, totaling $552.59. One check is dated November 30, 
1984, in the sum of $369.59 and the other is dated January 7, 1985, 
in the sum of $183.00. Copies of each of those checks are 
contained on "Exhibit C" attached hereto. 
6. No other payments have been made by Olcotts to 
Prematic or TIE other than those referred to in Paragraph 5 above. 
7. Based upon the Application, TIE provided insurance 
coverage for the Olcotts from November 30, 1984, until at least 
February 6, 1985. 
8. Applications to TIE for commercial insurance 
coverage, such as the Application received from the Olcotts, do not 
specify rates or premium computations when submitted by the writing 
agents, as the setting of premiums for each risk to be insured is 
the function and responsibility of TIE'S rating department. 
tie.ol-2aff.bc 9 
9. When the Application was received by TIE at its 
Pocatello Regional Office, it contained no premium computations or 
rates. The rates and computations shown on the Application 
(Exhibit A) were added after the Application was received at TIE'S 
Pocatello Regional Office. 
10. Premiums charged by TIE in the State of Utah must 
conform to the rates filed by TIE with the insurance commissioner 
of the State of Utah. 
11. TIE'S underwriters determined, after reviewing the 
Application received from the agent, that the Olcotts' business was 
not eligible for insurance coverage at TIE'S preferred rates and, 
on or about January 22, 1985, TIE issued its notice that insurance 
coverage was being cancelled effective February 6, 1985. A copy of 
the Notice of Cancellation is attached hereto as "Exhibit D." 
12. Although a second application for insurance was 
received by TIE at its Pocatello Regional Office and a policy of 
insurance was issued at the higher or Mstandard" rate, the Olcotts 
have stated that they did not submit a second application and did 
not want insurance coverage at the higher or standard rate. 
13. The minimum earned premium due for Olcotts' 
insurance coverage for the period beginning on November 30, 1984, 
and ending on February 6, 1985, using TIE'S "preferred" or lower 
rate is Three Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars and Twenty-One Cents 
($367.21): 
tie.ol-2aff.bc 3 
Annual Premium (Preferred Rate) $4,869.00 
Membership Fee S 60.00 
Total Annual Premium: $4,929.00 
Less unearned premium based upon 
early cancellation using the 
customary pro rata premium calculation 
referred to in the Policy. 5(4,012.20) 
(.814 x $4929.00 = unearned premium) 
Earned Premium: $ 916.80 
Less payments received $ f549.59l 
(552.59 less $3.00 service charge for 
budget plan) 
Earned Premium Due: $ 367.21 
14. The pro rata decimal (factor) of .814 shown in 
Paragraph 13 above is derived by using MThe Ronoco Six And Twelve 
Month Calculator," a calibration calculator commonly used in the 
insurance industry to determine pro rata and short rate earned and 
unearned factors. The calculator is prepared and produced by the 
Rough Notes Co., Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 46204. 
15. The rate used in Paragraph 13 above is based'upon 
and conforms to the rates and rate modifications filed by TIE with 
the insurance commissioner of the State of Utah for the period of 
November 30, 1984, to February 6, 1985. 
DATED this day of December, 1991. 
BRAD G. CHILTON 
Subscribed ^fiS^fS^^n to before me this /£) day of 
December, 1991. 
fJANCYS.HERRiaubtarrf- Publ>6- ' ERRIOfota ^ blje
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WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. 
BEVERLEY A. RAMSEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
POREM DEPARTMENT 
FARMER'S INSURANCE GROUP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN OLCOTT and BETTY 
OLCOTT dba JB'S PEPPER 
TREE MARKET, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 86-CV-89 
COME NOW the Defendants above named and answer and counter-
claim as follows: 
1. Admits paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's complaint 
2. Defendants are without sufficient informationoand be-
lief to ascertain the truth'or falsity of the language contained 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the complaint and therefore deny same. 
3. Defendants deny paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. 
WHEREFORE, having answered the complaint of Plaintiff, 
Defendants pray that the same may be dismissed and that they be 
awarded the request o^ their counterclaim. 
nil 
COUNTERCLAIM 
1. On or about February 17, 1986, Plaintiff brought a cause 
of action as more particularly stated in the complaint of Plain-
tiff herein. 
2. Said complaint has been brought by Plaintiff malicious-
ly and with no reasonable or justifiable cause. 
3. By reason of Plaintiff's actions, Defendant^ have suf-
fered injury to their credit and reputation, all to their damage 
in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
4. By reason of the action commenced by Plaintiff, Defen-
dants will be forced to incur reasonable and necessary counsel 
fees in an amount to be determined at the time of trial. 
5* By reason of Plaintiff's institution of said action, 
maliciously and with intent to injury Defendants, Defendants are 
therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be proven 
at the time of trial. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56, the original 
complaint of Plaintiff has not been brought by the party-Plaintiff 
in good faith and was without merit and therefore Defendants re-
quest reasonable attorney's fees be awarded. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against the Plain-
tiff in I the above-requested amounts. 
DATED this 2& day of / ^ ^ , 1986. 
WAYNE/B/ WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
